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The purpose of this thesis is to study the different types of
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I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this thesis is to study the different types
of incentives for recruiters that are used in the private
sector of the U.S. economy and in the U.S. Navy, and to
examine how, if possible, incentives that are used for
civilian recruiters can be applied to the Navy.
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Navy has a unique labor market in that it "grows
its own labor force." That is, the Navy promotes its people
from within. In the enlisted corps, all enlistees start "at
the bottom and work their way up." The officer corps is
basically the same. The Navy rarely recruits people to mid-
junior grade levels except in some specialized communities,
such as the Nurse and Doctor corps.
In times of drawdown and shrinking budgets, one may ask,
"why do we need recruiters?" Recruiters are needed for two
basic reasons. First, as previously mentioned, the Navy grows
its own. Just because of drawdown conditions or even a
sluggish economy, the Navy still needs recruiters to attract
quality people for the Naval Service. Second, the recruiting
process acts as the screening mechanism to ensure that quality
recruits enter the Naval Service. So whether the economy is
good or bad, whether there is drawdown or growth, the Navy-
will always need recruiters.
The U.S. Navy has approximately 500,000 service members.
Managing and maintaining its force is an awesome management
challenge. In order to recruit the most effective and
eligible people. Navy personnel planners and decision-makers
rely on their recruiters to attract and select the most
potentially qualified personnel. Not only is the Navy
concerned with incentives for recruits, but also the Navy is
concerned with incentives for its recruiters. "The management
challenge is to employ these recruiters as efficiently as
possible." [Ref. l:p. 7]
B. AN OUTLINE OF THE RECRUITING PROCESS
The recruiting process can be thought of in three dimen-
sions: the market for recruits, the recruiters, and the
recruiting areas and districts.
1. The Market for Recruits
The first dimension is the market for recruits. In
order to determine the mental group category of each recruit,
the Navy uses the Airmed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
percentile score.
Upper -mental -group (UMG) recruits score at or above the
50th percentile on the AFQT [and are divided into MGl
(percentiles 93 to 99) , MG2 (percentiles 65 to 92) , and
MG3 [upper (U) or A] (percentiles 50 to 64)]. Lower-
mental -group (LMG) recruits score below the 50th percen-
tile and are divided into MG3 [lower (L) or B]
(percentiles 31 to 49) and MG4 (percentiles 10 to 30) .
MG5 (percentiles 1 to 9) individuals are not recruited.
[Ref.lrp. 5]
Recruits are further classified as either High School
Diploma Graduates (HSDG) or Non High School Diploma Gradu-
ates/General Equivalency Diplomas (NHSDG/GED) . Table I illus-
trates the matrix of recruit quality.
Table I. MATRIX OF RECRUIT QUALITY BY MENTAL CATEGORY.
Percentile Mental Category
93 to 99 1
65 to 92 2
50 to 64 3 Upper (U) or A
31 to 49 3 Lower (L) or B
10 to 30 4
to 9 5
Source: CNA Research Memorandum 86-269
Crossing mental groups one through four (group five, is
not recruited) with HSDG status defines six recruit quality
categories. These are the categories used by Navy manpower
planners and are illustrated in Table II.
2. The Recruiters
The second dimension of Navy recruiting is recruiters.
Navy enlisted recruiters can be categorized into three broad
functions: production recruiters whose main task is to enlist
new recruits; supervisory recruiters who are primarily
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Source: CNA Research Memorandum 88-27.
concerned with managing the production recruiting force; and
a small number of recruiters who do not enlist new recruits
but have more specialized duties such as community relations
and oversight of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP-"-) . [Ref . l:p.
6]
3. The Areas and Districts
The final dimension is the recruiting areas and dis-
tricts. There are six recruiting areas which are further
subdivided into 41 recruiting districts. These are summarized
in Table III.
With these three dimensions in place, the management chal-
lenge, then, is to employ the recruiters as efficiently as
possible across the six areas and 41 districts to recruit the
highest quality recruit at the lowest possible cost. Because
"The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) allows a person to sign an
enlistment contract up to one year in advance of actually entering
the Navy and beginning active duty.






















































Source: CNA Research Memorandum 88-27.
the number of people recruited and their quality vary substan-
tially with the recruiters' effectiveness, Navy planners offer
incentives to their recruiters to encourage individual
recruiters to recruit the highest quality recruit possible.
Providing recruiters with a good system of incentives
promotes desirable levels of effort in both good and bad
recruiting markets. With such a system, recroiiters are
encouraged to be as productive as possible, consistent
with an acceptable (or optimum) individual level of
effort. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
In recent years, several excellent studies of Navy
recruiting have been done. In his 1986 study of Individual
Incentives in Navy Recruiting . Timothy W. Cooke of the Center
for Naval Analysis found that "incentives for individual
recruiters are currently tied to a fixed standard of perfor-
mance, independent of the relative difficulty of the recruit-
ing market in a particular geographic area." Specifically, he
examined data on Freeman points earned i.e., points earned by
recruiters who exceed their quota.
C. THE FREEMAN PLAN
In 1979, the Navy implemented the Recruiter Productivity
and Personnel Management System (RPPMS) , otherwise known as
the Freeman Plan^ . This program stayed in effect until 1989
when it was canceled. A recruiter's productivity was measured
by the number of new enlistment contracts obtained in a 12-
month period less any attrition of individuals in the DEP
awaiting accession. The Freeman Plan also required a minimum
of two enlistments per month (not including DEP attrition)
which had to meet policy requirements for desired mental
aptitude and HSDG status. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
Under the Freeman Plan, points were awarded to the
recruiter depending on three determinants of the quality of a
recruit. The first determinant was the entrance quality of
the recruit. The mental group crossed with HSDG status
determined the number of points awarded to a recruiter for a
^The plan was named for Admiral Dewitt Freeman, who, while
working as a special advisor to Commander, Navy Recruiting Command,
devised this plan to enhance recruiter productivity by offering a
system of awards for top performers. [Ref.3:p. 5]
Table IV. FREEMAN PLAN POINTS BY RECRUIT QUALITY,
Status
Mental Group
I II IIIU IIIL IV
HSDG 116 107 100 90 70
NHSDG 100 90 85 65
Source: CNA Research Memorandum 86-269.
particular quality of recruit. Table IV lists the Freeman
Plan points by recruit quality. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
Accumulation of Freeman Plan points then translated into
four recruiter awards. These four awards required the
following average point accumulations per month measured over
a 12-month period [Ref. l:p. 14 and Ref. 2:p. 2]:
1. Certificate of Commendation: 300 points
2. Navy Achievement Medal: 350 points
3. Voluntary extension of recruiting duty: 400 points
4. Advancement of pay grade: 525 points
The Certificate of Commendation is a recognition of
individual performance. Although less prestigious than the
other three awards, the certificate is placed in the service
jacket (permanent record) of the recruiter and is worth
advancement points to the next grade at the next promotion
cycle.
The Navy Achievement medal is also worth advancement
points and is a personal decoration for exemplary individual
8
performance. This is an actual medal and is worn at dress
occasions, such as changes of command, while a ribbon signify-
ing the medal is usually worn with other uniforms.
Voluntary extension of duty may be preferred by an
individual who is particularly enjoying recruiting duty and
desires to remain in a particular geographic location for an
extended period of time.
Advancement of pay grade is probably the most desirable of
all awards. This means not only an increase in rank but also
an increase in length of service (longevity) pay.
The second determinant of recruit quality is survivor
rate: the propensity of a recruit to complete a term of
enlistment and to reenlist. CNA analysts reported 40 -month
suirvival rates for non-prior-service male recruits of fiscal
year (FY) 1981. For example, survival rates for male, non-
prior- service recruits in category I with a high school
diploma were 0.75 while male, non-prior- service recruits of
the same category but without a high school diploma had a
survival rate of 0.49. Cooke suggests that these survival
rates have implications for the appropriate dispersion of the
Freeman Plan point awards. That is, "if the relative value of
recruits to the Navy is determined solely by survival profiles
(and it should not be) , the implied point values are defined
as ratios of the survival rates." [Ref. 2:p. 4] For example,
the ratio of the two survival rates mentioned above (0.75 and
0.49) is 1.53 (0.75/0.49). This implies that a male, non-
prior- service recruit with a high school diploma in category
I is 1.53 times as "valuable" as a male, non-prior- seirvice
recruit of the same category but without a high school
diploma. Table V displays how Freeman Plan points would be
awarded if based solely on survivor rates.
Table V. FREEMAN PLAN POINTS BY SURVIVOR RATES.
Status
Mental Group
I II IIIU IIIL IV
HSDG 107 107 100 94 90
NHSDG 70 66 57 57
Source: CNA Research Memorandum 86-269.
Note that the ratio of HSDG category I to NHSDG category
I is 107/70 = 1.53. This is the same value of the ratio of
respective survivor rates as shown above. All other catego-
ries also have the same ratio values as do their respective
survivor rates as reported by CNA analysts.
The final dimension of recruit quality is the difference
in productivity, or contribution to readiness, between
recruits. Unfortunately, measuring productivity of a recruit
is extremely subjective; as such, there is very little
empirical data on the differences in productivity between
recruits and very little is known about the extent of marginal
productivity between the categories of recruits. Therefore,
Freeman Plan point tabulations for productivity do not exist.
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Cooke best summarized the Freeman Plan:
The Freeman plan is a simple prize system, with fixed
performance criteria. At the extremes, there may be no
winners or all recruiters may receive a prize.
D. PROBLEMS WITH THE FREEMAN PLAN
A basic discrepancy with the Freeman Plan is the manner in
which points are awarded. If Freeman Plan points are awarded
based on recruit mental category, then according to table IV,
a NHSDG of mental group I is more valuable than a HSDG of
mental group IIIL. But if Freeman Plan points are awarded by
survivor rate (the propensity of a recruit to survive to the
end of his first term and reenlist) then, according to table
V, a NHSDG of mental group I is not as valuable as a HSDG of
mental group IIIL. Therefore, the distribution of incentive
points in table IV overestimates the relative value of NHSDG
recruits. Thus, a recruiter may be more likely to recruit a
NHSDG of mental group I simply because of the incentive point
value even though such a particular recruit is less valuable
to the Navy in terms of survivor potential.
Another problem exists. The six regions and 41 recruiting
districts are inherently different. Even if area and district
boundaries could be instantaneously redefined to perfection,
they would soon change because of continuously changing
demographics. Areas and districts will always be different.
A given skill and effort on the part of a recruiter in one
region may produce more qualified recruits than the same skill
11
and effort in another and vice versa. Therefore, a quota
system that assigns the same quota to recruiters in each area
and district and one that gives the same incentive for
producing beyond the quota is unlikely to be optimal.
Assuming performance of all recruiters is relatively equal
across the six areas and 41 districts, then differences in the
recruiting market may be reflected in two ways; by differenc-
es in the number of awards won in a particular area or
district, or by changes in the percentage of recruiters
winning awards over time.
E. COOKE'S FINDINGS
In his study, Cooke examines Freeman Point tabulations in
three ways: (1) the means of Freeman Point Distributions by
area and year (1980-84), (2) percentiles (50, 60, 70, 80, 90,
and 95) of Freeman Point Distributions by area and year, and
(3) the number and percentage of recruiters in each area who
achieved each of the award levels by fiscal year. Cooke finds
that the distribution of Freeman Points over time and across
regions varies. "From the perspective of the Freeman award
plan, recruiters achieve better results in some years than
others and in some places than others." [Ref. 2:p. 12] That
is, assuming that recruiter ability is equal across areas and
districts and time, then an inequality of outcome reflects
recruiting opportunity or lack thereof. Therefore, an incen-
12
tive system other than one of a fixed performance criterion
may provide a better incentive mechanism for recruiters.
F. COOKE'S PROPOSAL
In the recruiting process, Navy planners must balance
uncertain variables while allocating recruiting resources.
Such variables include recruit possibilities, recruiter
population and effort, past production, and economic and
demographic conditions. These variables lead to uncertainty in
the recruiting process. But, as Cooke points out, "recent
research in the economics of incentives reveals that, under
some conditions regarding sources of uncertainty about
recruiter effort, competitively determined rewards are better
incentive devices than piece rate schemes (bounties) or
tournaments with a non- competitive prize structure."
G. BENEFITS OF A COMPETITIVE INCENTIVE PLAN
A competitive incentive plan is one where an individual is
compared to his peers rather than to a fixed performance stan-
dard, such as the Freeman Plan.
The benefit of a competitive plan is that it adapts
automatically to its environment which, in terms of recruit-
ers, encourages greater recruiter effort whether the market is
good or bad, difficult or easy. Furthermore, increased
efficiency would result and also, planners would not have to
consider matching incentives to changing market conditions for
13
recruits. Thus, a competitive reward system based on relative
performance among recruiters by area or even district may tend
to equalize reward opportunities for a given level or effort.
Rewards based only on performance relative to others in
the same area may increase production incentives for
recruiters in relatively difficult recruiting areas; they
are not discouraged by the difficulty of reaching speci-
fied point accumulation totals. They instead are awarded
according to their ability and effort relative to other
recruiters in similar circumstances. [Ref. 2:p. 13]
Therefore, if Commander, Naval Recruiting Command (COMNAV-
CRUITCOM or CNRC) did not use a point accumulation system
based on fixed performance criteria but, instead, used
relative performance criteria where the top "X" percent of
recruiters in each area or district received a certain type of
award, then the relative performance criteria would encourage
recruiter effort in both good and bad markets and the effi-
ciency of the recruiting process would increase.
H. POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF A COMPETITIVE INCENTIVE PLAN
In the Freeman Plan, a recruiter's performance was
compared to the performance of all other recruiters throughout
the country. Because the Freeman Plan was a fixed prize
system, each recruiter competed for awards with all other
recruiters not just within a district or area but across the
nation. Because areas and districts are so large, it may be
appealing to reduce the size of the geographic area in which
recruiters are competing to meet a competitive performance
system.
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But Cooke discusses three potential problems with a
competitive incentive plan. The first is that of collusion.
Depending on the size of the area or district, recruiters may-
collude to reduce their level of performance and effort and
thereby reduce production. Thus, given collusion, competitive
awards would be handed out for a relatively lower level of
performance compared to that of fixed perfoirmance criteria.
But collusion is highly unlikely given the sizes of the areas
and districts and the numbers of recruiters assigned to each
particular area and district. The areas and districts are
just too big and there are too many recruiters for collusion,
if any, to be effective. [Ref. l:p. 19 and Ref. 2:p. 13]
The second potential problem with a competitive incentive
plan, Cooke mentions, is that those recruiters who feel they
"know" they cannot achieve the top "X" percent will be less
motivated to be productive than they would be under a fixed
incentive plan. With a fixed incentive plan, a particular
level of effort may result in an award while in a competitive
system, the same level of effort may not result in an award.
Therefore, those recruiters who feel they cannot achieve the
top "X" percent with a reasonable effort may not find it
worthwhile to put in extra effort.
But what about those who easily achieve their goals and
find themselves in the top "X" percent? Once they have
reached their goal, why should they expend extra effort? That
is, if a recruiter maximizes his or her award, then why
15
achieve even more? Just as underachieving can prove detrimen-
tal to productivity, so can overachieving.
The final potential problem with a competitive incentive
plan is that of variation of recruiting opportunity. Recruit-
ing opportunities can vary not only within and between
districts but also between areas. For example, for any given
area, some districts may have comparable recruiting opportuni-
ties while others may not. Although it is highly unlikely and
would be extremely difficult to measure, some areas may have
comparable recruiting opportunities. Therefore, depending on
the equality of recruiting opportunities, a competitive
incentive system may be applicable to only one particular
district or it may be applicable to several districts, or even
areas
.
A competitive incentive plan, then, if used, must be care-
fully administered. For example, if two noncomparable
districts are operating under the same competitive incentive
plan, then the disadvantaged district would not find it
economically rewarding to put forth extra effort while the
other district may reduce its productivity once it has met its
goals. The overall effect may be even less productivity for
the two districts than if they had been operating under a
fixed incentive plan. The same argument may hold true for two
or more given areas.
Although a competitive incentive plan has its advantages,
such disadvantages as those mentioned above should be kept in
16
mind. It should also be kept in mind, though, that a competi-
tive incentive system is primarily applicable to markets where
recruiting opportunities vary as opposed to those where they
are constant. The effects of competitive and fixed incentive
programs must be carefully balanced.
I. CURRENT INCENTIVES
As mentioned previously, the Freeman Plan was canceled in
1989. CNRC now has four incentive programs for its recruit-
ers. These are (1) Awards Recognition for Outstanding
Production Recruiters [Ref. 4], (2) Recruiter Meritorious
Advancement Program (RMAP) [Ref. 5] , (3) Recruiter Advancement
Through Excellence (RATE) Program [Ref. 6], and (4)
Gold/Silver Wreath Award For Excellence in Recruiting and
Recruiting Support [Ref. 7]
.
All four incentive programs are awarded to those individu-
als who demonstrate outstanding performance in their recruit-
ing tasks. Measuring performance, though, is normally subjec-
tive. It is done by the commanding officer when completing an
individual's professional evaluation. Some of the criteria
used when assessing a recruiter's performance are:
Sustained superior performance in recruiting/recruiting
support, individual performance of duty in assigned
billets must be exemplary. .
. ,
professionalism in the daily
conduct of assigned tasks..., positive leadership and
sound management contributing to mission accomplishment,
dedication to the recruiting mission, loyalty and support
of the chain of command, and a positive Navy image
fostered through the individual's behavior, cooperation,
and appearance. [Ref. 7, enclosure I, p. 1]
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1. Awards Recognition for Outstanding Production
Recruiters
The first incentive scheme, Awards Recognition for
Outstanding Training Production Recruiting, is an awards
program which provides the guidelines to award Navy Achieve-
ment Medals (NAMs) to outstanding recruiters (as measured by
the performance criteria listed above) . It is also designed
to replace the Recruiter Productivity and Personnel Management
System (Freeman Plan) , The objective of this program is to
encourage Navy Recruiting District commanding officers to
identify those production recruiters (including Recruiters in
Charge) who deserve recognition for outstanding performance
and effort. [Ref. 4:p. 1]
2. Recruiter Meritorious Advancement Program (RMAP)
The second incentive program is the RMAP. Its purpose
is to provide substantive recognition for superior performance
of production recruiters by advancing them in rank. The
program authorizes CNRC to advance 57 production recruiters to
the paygrade of E-6 and 14 to E-7 during a calendar year.
This program is intended to function in conjunction with, but
not replace, the Navy's established advancement system. [Ref.
5: p. 1]
Below is a list of the number of people in various
rates (and quantities) who were promoted under the RMAP
18
program during CY-89, 90 and 91 [Ref. 8] (see Appendix A for
definition of U.S. Navy Rates):
CY-89 CY-9 CY-91
Promotion from Rate Rate Rate
E-5 to E-6 ABE [2) ABF (2) ABH (3)
ABH ;i) AD (3) AD (3)
AE 'D AE (2) AO (1)
AMS [2) AK (1) BM (6)
AO '2) AMH (1) BT (2)
AT 3) AO (2) BU (1)
BM 2) AQ (1) CTO (1)
.
BT 2) AT (1) DP (1)
CTO 1) AW [1) ET (2)
CE 1) BM 14) PC (2)
DS 1) BT ;3) GMG (1)
EM 1) BU 2) HT (1)
EN 1) CM 1) IC (2)
EO 1) CE 1) LI (1)
ET ( 1) DT 1) MM (6)
GMM 2) DM 1) MT (1)
HM 1) EA 1) OS (9)
HT < 1) EM 1) QM (1)
IC 3) EN 1) RM (2)
IM < 1) EW I 1) SH (1)
LI < 1) PC ( 3) SM (2)






























































3. Recruiter Advancement Through Excellence (RATE)
Prograun
On 18 October 1989 (FY 90) , the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and Training) approved the
RATE program. This program is also intended to function in
conjunction with the Navy's established advancement system and
is open to all E-4 through E-7 personnel. This plan provides
special recognition for superior performance of production
recruiting teams. This program sets limits on those personnel
who may be advanced to paygrades E-5 and E-6 and authorizes up
to 90 advancements to paygrade E-7 and as many as 12 advance-
ments to paygrade E-8 per fiscal year. [Ref. 6: p. 1]
Below is a list of the number of people in various
rates (and quantities) who were promoted under the RATE
program during FY- 9 and 91 [Ref. 9] (see Appendix A for
definition of U.S. Navy Rates):
FY- 9 PY- 91
Promotion from Ratei Rate
E-7 to E-8 CTA (1) EM (1)
NC (1) DC (1)
EM (1) MM (1)
SK (1)
(4)Subtotal (3)
E-6 to E-7 AMS (1) DK (1)
AW (1) EN (1)
EW (1) MM (2)
;21
HM (1) MS (1)
HT (1) PN (4)
PN (2) YN (2)
YN (1).
Subtotal (8) (11)
E-5 to E-6 ABE (1) ABE (3)
ABF (2) ABH (3)
ABH (3) AC (1)
AD ;i) AD (6)
AMS [3) AE (2)
AO a) AME (2)
AT ;i) AMH (2)
AZ [2) AMS (3)
EM .4) AO (7)
BT '2) AS (1)
BU 2) AT (1)
CTR 2) AW !3)
DP 1) BM [2)
DTA ( 1) BT 3)
EN ( 1) BU 3)
ET ( 1) CTM ( 1)
FC ( 5) CTR { 3)
GMG ( 1) CTT ( 3)
GMM ( 1) CE ( 2)
IC ( 4) DC ( 1)


















































4. Gold/Silver Wreath Award
The final program, Gold/Silver Wreath Award for
Excellence in Recruiting and Recruiting Support, focuses
primarily on the members of a recruiting station. All
recruiters, officer and enlisted, assigned to recruiting
billets in the direct recruiting production chain are eligible
for the Gold Wreath Award. All other military and civilian
personnel who are assigned to CNRC but fall outside the
eligibility for the Gold Wreath are eligible for the Silver
Wreath.
The Gold/Silver Wreath Award is a metal wreath device
worn with a recruiting badge. The wreath encircles the
recruiting badge and has a small scroll in the design for
adding silver and gold stars in lieu of subsequent awards.
Silver or gold stars denote second and subsequent awards. In
a sequence of 49 awards, the Excellence Scroll, a device
24
inscribed with the word "EXCELLENCE", signifies the tenth
award and is attached to the top of the Gold or Silver Wreath
[Ref. 7:p. 1]
The Gold/Silver Wreath Award is awarded to member (s)
of a recruiting station based on such factors as the discre-
tion of the Commanding Officer, the overall performance of a
recruiter, the quality and quantity of recruits, and, of
course, whether the station meets its goal. For example, if
a station has five recruiters, a monthly goal of five re-
cruits, and meets the required criteria as delineated in CNRC
Instruction 1650. 4J, then each recruiter would be eligible for
the next applicable reward in the sequence of 49 awards. Even
if one of the five recruiters did not recruit one of the five
recruits but had contributed in some way to the station's
success and effort, then that recruiter is still eligible for
an award. However, the Commanding Officer decides if a
particular recruiter is eligible for an award.
J. CONCLUSION
Recruiting is expensive. The Navy has spent on the order
of $100 million recently for recruiting costs. In times of
fiscal austerity, the money spent on recruiting must be used
effectively and efficiently to find and attract the best
qualified recruits.
But this problem is not specific to the U.S. Navy. Many
companies operating under tight budgets in the private sector
25
of the U.S. economy are faced with similar challenges of
recruiting. Therefore, it may be beneficial to study what
some private companies have done in the past to handle their
recruiting challenges.
26
II. LITERATURE REVIEW - THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Recruiting and its associated problems are not unique to
the U.S. Navy. The large private sector in the U.S. faces,
and solves, similar recruiting problems regularly. Managers
of private companies that assign salespersons to regions
understand that some regions generate more sales than others
for a given skill and effort, and that the amount sold varies
with the salesperson's skill and effort. Somehow, they must
design incentives that work. Similarly, managers of some
large companies assign regions to recruiters. For a given
skill and effort of a recruiter, some regions yield more
recruits for a company than do others. And, for a given
region, the number of recruits varies with the recruiter's
skill and effort. These private sector managers must also
design incentives that work.
Because so many companies face, and apparently solve,
recruiting problems similar to the Navy's, the Navy may
benefit by studying the incentive systems used by the private
sector.
However, the literature is in its infancy -- researchers
simply have not discussed this particular problem. Informa-
tion concerning incentives for recruiters is scarce. There-
fore, instead of looking at the recruiter in a strict,
traditional definition, i.e., one whose sole purpose is to
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recruit, a broadened definition may be required to shed new
light on some innovative incentive mechanisms for recruiters
that have been used in past.
A. THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY
In the newspaper industry, the home carrier can easily be
thought of as the backbone of the industry who is the recruit-
er for the newspaper publisher. After all, it is the carrier
who primarily recruits new customers.
Paper carriers are valuable.
New carriers are more in demand now than ever before.
Newspapers across the country allocate large budgets to
lure prospective carriers, train them and keep them in
their jobs. [Ref. 9:p. 67]
"Some big papers spend $100,000 a year on circulation
promotions, with prizes for the kids: anything from football
tickets to trips to Disneyland." [Ref. 10 :p. 68] Any publisher
who wants a successful circulation department must find ways
to keep his carriers happy and on the job. Without carriers,
any publisher would not be able to maintain its particular
level of circulation. Publishers would have to spend large
amounts on alternative ways of delivery to maintain circula-
tion or else limit circulation to street boxes and vendors,
thereby reducing profits significantly. Again, the carrier is
valuable and probably the most efficient means of newspaper
delivery.
Although it sounds preposterous, the fact is that there is
no other system more efficient than adolescents on foot or
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on bicycles, all covering their own neighborhoods simulta-
neously, supported by well -organized networks of drivers,
dispatchers, and supervisors. I would match the system
any day against the post office, to say the least, says
Donald Dunk, one of the circulation managers of The
Toronto Star, which maintains the nation's largest
circulation (500,000 daily, 800,000 Saturday) and also,
not coincidentally, the best support system and the
largest complement of carriers - about 12,000. [Ref. 10:
p. 67]
"Delivery boys are simply the ideal system for getting the
paper out," says Gerald Ouellette of the Los Angeles Times.
The paper carrier, therefore, is the publisher's most
valuable recruiter. "The dilemma everywhere comes not only in
finding carriers but [also] in keeping them happy with all
manner of giveaways and contests and then recruiting replace-
ments when such gingerbread fails to do its job or as carriers
simply grow up or become bored." [Ref. 10:p. 68] Thus, incen-
tives for the carrier, or the "customer recruiter" are
important
.
Incentives come in all varieties. "The staple promotion
is the offer of cash or merchandise to the carriers who bring
in the greatest numbers of circulation 'starts'." [Ref. 10:p.
68]
Walter Rosolowich, city circulation manager for The
Winnipeg Tribune, defines two types of incentives, "the long-
range and the quickie." The former deals with contests over
an extended period of time, a few to several months for
example, and results with a substantial reward, such as a trip
to Disneyland. The latter focuses more on providing an
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incentive to the carrier to get a certain number of new
customers in a short period of time which might result in a
reward of small gifts, such as tickets to a professional
sports event. [Ref. 10 :p. 68]
Although some publishers, such as the Vancouver Sun, The
Edmonton Journal, The Winnipeg Tribune, and the Montreal
Gazette, are more fond of cash incentives. The Calgary
Aijbertan finds "the best results come with gifts (often
televisions, radios, bikes) and trips (to Hawaii) ." But Arthur
J. Condliffe of the circulation department for The Globe and
Mail, which claims to be Canada's national newspaper, warns
"if you do the same thing too many times the kids tire of it,
the key to this thing is variety."
Incentives are important. As in all business, even the
military and, in particular, the U.S. Navy, human capital is
probably the most important investment. In order to attract
and retain quality personnel, businesses must not only provide
incentives for their recruits, but also must provide incen-
tives for their recruiters.
B. THE COSMETICS INDUSTRY - MARY KAY
In the cosmetics industry, the same situation applies.
"Mary Kay Cosmetics ... really took off in the past two years,
in response to added incentives for its beauty consultants and
the sales directors who supervise them." [Ref. ll:p. 50]
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At Mary Kay, the beauty consultants are the sales people
who not only sell cosmetics, but also recruit new beauty
consultants. Thus, in effect, the beauty consultants are
recruiters. Furthermore, "once a consultant recruits 24
women, she is eligible to go through a training program to
become a sales director. Like the consultant, the sales
director ... spends more time recruiting and managing recruits
than selling." [Ref, ll:p. 81] Thus, there are two levels of
recruiters at Mary Kay: the consultant and the sales director.
The primary incentive that Mary Kay has used for its sales
people, or beauty consultants, was an opportunity to make more
money. This was done in the following manner. Initial
earnings for the sales people consisted of "the markup they
make on the products they sell plus a percentage of the
revenue produced by the people they recruit." [Ref. ll:p. 50]
Then Mary Kay increased the incentives. "Recruitment commis-
sions were increased from a maximum of 4% of sales to a
maximum of 8%, depending on the number of recruits." [Ref. 11:
p. 50]
Mary Kay also increased the incentives for its sales
directors. "This was accomplished by doubling recruitment
commissions, adding bonuses for recruiting and selling above
certain levels, and instituting awards, such as the use of
expensive cars." [Ref. ll:p. 50]
In a form of other incentives, high achievers receive
awards ranging from diamond rings to shopping sprees at
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Neiman-Marcus. The most distinctive prize is the use of a pink
Cadillac or Buick Regal. [Ref. 11 :p. 50]
C. THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
In a traditional sense, a recruiter is one who recruits
new people to work for a particular company. But in the
computer industry, some companies are augmenting conventional
recruiting with employee referral plans. Although employee
referral plans are not a new idea, they do offer an alterna-
tive approach to recruiting that can offer significant cost
savings to conventional methods of recruiting by reducing or
eliminating the use of employment agencies.
In the early 1980s, as the use of computers began to
explode and banking became increasingly electronic. Bank of
America was in demand for Data Processors (DP) . At the time.
Bank of America had 9,000 DPs and would need another 1,000
professionals within the next year, according to Charles B.
Smith, manager of recruitment services for electronic banking.
[Ref. 12 :p. 11] To meet this demand. Smith and Bank of America
put together a stepwise employee referral program. "Under
this system, an employee receives $750 for the first person
referred and hired, $1,000 for the second, $1,250 for the
third, and $1,500 for the fourth." In essence, Smith turned
his 9000 Dps into 9,000 recruiters. Smith also estimated a
75% in savings of recruitment costs compared to using an
employment agency. [Ref. 12 :p. 11]
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Crocker National Bank of San Francisco found itself in the
same position. When about 70 new DP professionals were
required to help the bank meet its DP needs, an employee
referral program was offered that featured a $1,000 award for
each employee hired. [Ref. 12 :p. 11]
This employee referral program was not limited to the
banking industry nor were incentives limited to cash.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, just north of San Francis-
co, offered their employees referring DP professionals a
choice of awards: an after- tax bonus of $500 or a trip to one
of four Club Mediterranean resorts. Fireman's professional
recruiting consultant, Leonard "Bernie" Bernstein, estimated
30% to 35% of their 850 DP staff was gained through their
employee referral program. [Ref. 12 :p. 11]
Other companies on the East coast offer similar programs.
ASA, Inc., a professional services firm, offers trips to
Bermuda to its employees who refer new employees. The company
estimates it saves $1,000 to $1,500 on recruiting costs that
would have otherwise been paid to employment agencies. [Ref.
12:p. 11]
Software Design Associates, Inc. (SDA) , a software
development firm headquartered in New York City, has devised
its own referral incentive program. Their intent was to
encourage employees to continue referring Dps.
An initial referral would earn an SDA employee two tickets
to a show on Broadway or dinner. If the referral was hired,
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then after 3 working days, the employee would receive a
$1,000 bonus. Nine new hires would net an employee making
such referrals, a "free" lunch and a chance to win a $2,500
personal computer. In the first two years of the program,
Boomi Waxman, Personnel Manager for SDA corporate headquar-
ters, reported that 18 of 68 new hires (25%) had been made
through the employee referral program. [Ref. 12 :p. 11]
On a larger scale, some companies were offering relocation
benefits to their new hires. Generous relocation benefits
such as reduced rate mortgages were common. While Bank of
America offered employee mortgages at rates of a relatively
low 10.5 percent, Crocker offered mortgages at 1 percentage
point below prevailing rates to those who agreed to move.
[Ref. 12:p. 11]
D. CONTINGENCY RECRUITERS
In a more traditional sense, Contingency Recruiters are
another alternative to headhunter and employment agencies.
The contingency recruiter can be thought of as somewhere
between the two extremes of the headhunter and the employment
agency. Contingency recruiters operate independently of
companies who use them and are usually called upon to find
presidents, board chairmen, chief financial officers, and
chief operating officers. Their fee structure can be anything
from per-diem plus expenses to the most common, a prearranged
fee, usually a percentage of the candidate's first year
34
salary. Some contingency recruiters have combination fees.
That is, a company will agree to pay a certain percentage of
the candidate's first year salary to the contingency recruiter
and the company will also agree to pay per-diem plus expenses
while the search is being made. [Ref. 13 :p. 34]
E. CONCLUSION
The private sector of the U.S. economy is continually
faced with the challenge of attracting and maintaining an
effective work force. Attracting motivated workers is the
main task of the recruiter. Without incentives, a recruiter
may recruit someone who, although qualified to perform a
particular job, puts forth only a minimum effort; a recruiter
operating under an effective incentive plan, on the other
hand, may find better workers. Although incentive plans for
recruiters may be expensive in the short run, recruiting
minimally qualified people may be even more expensive in the
long run. Therefore, an incentive plan for recruiters may be
more economically sound than none at all.
The next chapter presents results of original research on
incentive plans that various firms use.
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III. ACTUAL INCENTIVES
As Stated earlier in chapter II, the literature on incen-
tives for recruiters is in its infancy -- researchers simply
have not discussed this particular area. And just as informa-
tion regarding incentives for recruiters is scarce, this
research has also found that incentive programs for recruiters
are scarce.
In order to assess the prevalence of incentive programs
for recruiters, the research for this thesis included a
written questionnaire (see Appendix B) that polled 105
companies throughout the U.S. on whether they had incentive
programs for their recruiters. The questionnaire was sent to
the president of each company which was randomly selected from
a book titled Jobs '91 [Ref . 14] . This book is broken into
chapters governing all professional groups and provides a list
of all major companies of all major industries throughout the
U.S. Four to seven companies from each industry group listed
were selected as representative companies across each particu-
lar industry. Companies that were addressed were in the
industry groups as listed in Table VI.
Twenty- two companies replied to the questionnaire in a
written response. These companies represented conglomerates,
banking and financing, soft drink beverages, computers,
commercial airlines, cosmetics, oil, power tools, aerospace.
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technology research and development, scientific research and
development, sugar, food chain stores, domestic automobile
production, and foreign automobile production. But of the 22
companies that responded, 2 had no incentive program whatso-
ever.
Although most of the companies polled had no specific
incentive program, one of two recurring responses was that
some companies offered compensation in the form of a superior
performance award program or bonus. That is, employees who
found valuable recruits for the company were recognized for
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their efforts in the form of a performance award but not in a
specific incentive award. The other recurring response was
that executive search firms or headhunter agencies were used
and were paid their customary fees. But overall, the 20
companies that responded to the questionnaire had no specific
incentive program for their recruiters.
Two of the companies, however, did mention some form of an
incentive program for their recruiters. One of the companies
operated its incentive program under an employee referral
system. It paid a recruitment bonus in the form of a $1,000
U.S. Savings Bond to those employees who recruited full-time
personnel (as opposed to part-time)
.
The other company operated on a point system. This
company, which will be called company "X" for anonymity,
awarded points which could be accumulated and redeemed for
valuable prizes. Every sales agent had the opportunity to
cash in his or her points from a selection of 261 gift awards
from an awards catalog. Those agents, however, who reached a
higher level of sales, could choose from another awards
catalog consisting of an additional 491 gift offerings. Such
gifts were stereo systems, outdoor recreational equipment,
computer systems, video camera equipment, luggage, china, and
childrens' toys. This point system operated in three differ-
ent aspects: total sales, sales increase, and recruiting.
Under the total sales aspect, employees earned a certain
number of points as their total sales, measured over a one
38
year period, increased. Points were earned for each $500
increment in sales and were awarded by category as described
in Table VII.
Table VII. POINT DISTRIBUTION FOR EVERY $500 IN SALES FOR
COMPANY X.
Points awarded Category
1 Up to $8,500
3 $8,501 to $20,000
5 $20,001 to $40,000
7 $40,000 to $60,000
10 $60, 001 and up
The second aspect of the incentive program depended on the
amount that sales increased over the previous year. That is,
for each $500 increase over the previous year, points were
awarded as shown in Table VIII.
The third aspect of the point system involved recruiting.
For each successful recommendation, an employee would earn a
certain number of points. The points were awarded as shown in
Table IX. The employee also had the option of choosing a $20
check for each successful recommendation.
One of the companies polled -- a defense contractor --
offered a reason for not having an incentive plan -- the
company does not need one in the present economic conditions.
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Table VIII. POINTS
PREVIOUS YE^R FOR C




Points earned for each $500
increase over previous year
$1 to $8,500 5
$8,501 to $20,000 15
$20,000 to $40,000 25
$40,001 to $60,000 35
$60,001 to $80,000 45
$80, 000 and over 50
Table IX.
COMPANY X.





2 through 5 20 each
6 through 10 25 each
11 and over 3 each
This particular company stated:
Unlike the U.S. military, we invariably find ourselves
with a surplus of potential employees. As such, we can be
far more selective of those to whom we offer employment
and do not necessarily need to spend much time recruiting
qualified people.
This response may be an underlying reason why most
companies do not have an incentive program. Most companies
have potential employees "knocking on their door" whereas the
Navy must usually "knock on" a potential recruit's door.
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Nevertheless, just as information on incentives for recruiters
is scarce, so is information on incentive programs.
Although the research for this thesis has discovered that
incentive programs for recruiters are not nearly as popular as
initially thought, the research has nevertheless discovered a
unique incentive program in the real estate world.
One may be initially inclined to think that there are no
recruiters in the real estate industry. If one thinks of
realtors as recruiters of buyers and sellers of real estate,
however, then in essence, realtors are recruiters. And one
company in the real estate world is using the paradigm of
sales commission in a new way.
Real Estate Maximum, more commonly known as RE/Max (pro-
nounced REEMAX) , uses an alternative approach to incentivize
their realtors. Instead of splitting a traditional six
percent sales commission with possibly another realtor and
their own realtors, RE/Max allows their realtors to keep 100%
of the sales commission but only after meeting a fee for use
of the franchise. The fee ranges on average from $18,000 to
$25,000 per year [Ref . 15, p. Al] which is paid by the realtor
on a monthly basis. This equates to $1,500 to about $2,100
per month. So as long as the realtor can meet the monthly fee
plus any office and related expenses, then any sales commis-
sion after the monthly fee and expenses belongs solely to the
realtor.
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Thus, in essence, there are two incentives here. The
first incentive is to work hard enough to meet the monthly
fees and related expenses. This is in contrast to the
traditional method of other real estate firms where the
company usually pays for office and related expenses but also
takes up to 50% of the sales commission depending on sales
volume. For example, two real estate companies usually split
a six percent sales commission upon the sale of a house.
This, of course, means that each company gets three percent.
Then each company in turn splits the three percent with their
agent. That is, each agent winds up with 1.5 percent sales
commission. But as the agent's sales volume goes up, the
agent will usually get to keep a little more than 1.5 percent
of the sales commission. But in the traditional sense, the
agent never gets to keep all of the sales commission, whereas,
working under the RE/Max system, although there is pressure to
meet a minimum amount, once the minimum amount has been met,
then all future sales commissions belong solely to the
realtor. This system may be especially enticing to a success-
ful real estate agent.
The second incentive is sole possession of the sales
commission. Once the minimum monthly expenses have been met,
then 100% of a sales commission can mean a large sum of money.
So those agents who feel they can easily meet a cost of $1,500
to $2,100 per month plus related expenses may want to use the
RE/Max incentive program.
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to study the different
types of incentive programs for recruiters that are used in
the private sector of the U.S. economy and to examine how, if
possible, incentives that are used for civilian recruiters can
be applied to U.S. Navy recruiters.
But quite the opposite has been discovered. Probably the
single most surprising discovery of this research is the
scarcity of incentive programs for recruiters in the private
sector of the U.S. economy. In addition to this discovery,
four themes have evolved from this research: 1) the manner
in which the term "recruiter" is defined, 2) potential
recruiters, 3), referral systems for recruiters and 4) the
Navy is a potential role model, if not a leader, of incentive
programs for recruiters. These four themes are explained
below.
A. LESSONS FOR THE NAVY
Although the Navy can be considered a role model of
incentive programs for recruiters, the Navy may be able to
further strengthen its recruiting force by broadening its
definition of the term "recruiter." The literature review in
chapter II showed how a broadened definition of recruiter led
to some innovative ideas of who recruiters could be. Paper
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carriers could be looked at as recruiters of customers;
beauty consul '-ants at Mary Kay also acted as recruiters; the
computer industry used employee referral programs to encourage
their DPs to act as recruiters. Chapter III looked at real
estate agents as recruiters of buyers and sellers of real
estate.
So by expanding the definition of recruiter, the second
theme may be considered. Any employee or member of an
organization may become a potential recruiter. And in the
case of the Navy, instead of looking at its recruiters as only
those who are specifically assigned to the recruiting force,
the Navy could look at each one of its members as a potential
recruiter.
This introduces the third theme mentioned above. When the
computer industry used their DPs as recruiters, they also used
employee referral plans to incentivize their new recruiters.
Maybe, then, the Navy could set up a referral incentive or
system to those members whose referral winds up with a
successful recruit. This, in turn, leads to a potential topic
for further research --a referral system for the Navy.
The final theme that can be drawn from this research is
that the Navy is a potential role model, if not a leader, of
incentive programs for recruiters (and not vice versa as
initially thought) . Part of the purpose of this thesis was to
examine how, if possible, the incentive systems used for
recruiters in the private sector could be applied to the U.S.
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Navy. But because of the scarcity of incentive systems in the
private sector, it may be the private sector companies, that
have a need for incentive programs for their recruiters, that
may benefit from studying those incentive systems of the Navy
or the other branches of the armed services. Ironically,
further research that may be beneficial, then, is how to adapt
and apply Navy incentives to the private sector.
Two more significant points can be drawn from this
research. The first was made earlier in the literature
review. In the newspaper industry, Arther J. Condi if fe of the
circulation department for The Globe and Mail warned about
using an incentive too much for paper carriers. "If you do
the same thing too many times the kids tire of it, the key to
this thing is variety." Although the Navy's recruiting force
is constantly turning over, i.e., a recruiter's term last two
to three years before he or she moves on to a new assignment,
and may not get tired of the incentives, it is an important
point to consider. Further research in the area of varying
incentive programs for the Navy may be another possible
research topic.
The other point brought out in this research was that of
Company X's incentive plans for sales and recruits. Further
inspection of Tables VII, VIII, and IX reveals that for each
marginal sale or recruit, the points awarded always increased.
This seems to reflect that the next sale or recruit is more
difficult than the last. So the company was varying awards to
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compensate for the additional difficulty. For example,
looking at Table VIII, after the fifth recruit, 25 points are
awarded instead of 20, (the number of points awarded for the
first five recruits) . This suggests, as seems plausible, that
the supply of recruits is upward- sloping; that is, recruits
are harder and harder to get, so that recruiters must get
increasing compensation for each additional recruit.
B. A LESSON FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
As has' already been discussed, the Navy or military is a
role model, if not a leader, of incentive programs. Incentive
plans for recruiters in the private sector are limited at
best. Those companies that require an incentive plan for
their recruiters may benefit most by examining the incentive
mechanisms already in place in the Navy or armed services.
Researchers, though, would have to find ways in which to adapt
and apply incentives for Navy recruiters to recruiters in the
private sector.
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITION OF U.S. NAVY RATES
GROUP I: DECK
BM Boatswain's Mate
EW Electronics Warfare Technician
OS Operations Specialist












DS Data Systems Technician
ET Electronics Technician
GROUP IV: PRECISION EOUIPMENT
IM Instrumentman
GROUP V: ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL
CT Cryptologic Technician
DP Data Processing Technician (DP)
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DK ' . . . . Disbursing Clerk
JO Journalist















HT Hull Maintenance Technician










AB Aviation Boatswain's Mate
AD Aviation Machinist's Mate
AE Aviation Electrician's Mate
AK Aviation Storekeeper
AM Aviation Structural Mechanic
AO Aviation Ordnanceman
AQ Aviation Fire Control Technician
AS Aviation Support Equipment Technician
AT Aviation Electronics Technician
AW Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Operator
AZ Aviation Maintenance Administration
PR Aircrew Survival Equipmentman
GROUP X: MEDICAL
HM Hospital Corpsman
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If you have any type of written documentation of your
incentive programs for your recruiters, will you please send
it to me.
Unless you instruct otherwise, I will keep your responses
confidential
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